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Abstract
Science is replete with falsehoods that epistemically facilitate understanding by
virtue of being the very falsehoods they are. In view of this puzzling fact, some
have relaxed the truth requirement on understanding. I offer a factive view of
understanding (i.e., the extraction view) that fully accommodates the puzzling
fact in four steps: (i) I argue that the question how these falsehoods are related
to the phenomenon to be understood and the question how they figure into the
content of understanding it are independent. (ii) I argue that the falsehoods do
not figure into the understanding’s content by being elements of its periphery or
core. (iii) Drawing lessons from case studies, I argue that the falsehoods merely
enable understanding. When working with such falsehoods, only the truths we
extract from them are elements of the content of our understanding. (iv) I argue
that the extraction view is compatible with the thesis that falsehoods can have an
epistemic value by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are.
Understanding plays a central role in human inquiry, particularly in scientific inquiry.
Science aims at understanding phenomena, such as understanding language acquisi-
tion.1 Without loss of generality, understanding requires an epistemic commitment
to a systematic account of the phenomenon in question. Paradigmatic instances of
systematic accounts of phenomena are explanations or analyses thereof. One might say
that a subject understands a phenomenon only if they grasp an explanation or analysis
of it. In what follows, I call such analyses or explanations of the phenomenon to be
understood the content of understanding. The nature of the epistemic commitment
involved in understanding is contested. To accommodate the variety of understanding
theories, I remain neutral regarding whether it is a form of knowledge or whether it is
an epistemic commitment sui generis, whether abilities are constitutive of understand-
ing, etc. (For an overview of the debate see, e.g., Gordon 2017.) In what follows, I am
1 Understanding language acquisition is an example of so-called objectual understanding. Scientists also
want to understand why things are the case. My arguments apply to both forms of understanding. I
remain neutral regarding whether understanding why is a form of objectual understanding or vice versa
(see, e.g., Grimm 2011; Khalifa 2013; Baumberger and Brun 2017).
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exclusively concerned with the content of understanding. In a nutshell, I argue that
the use of prominent falsehoods in science is compatible with a factive view about
understanding. I call this view the extraction view. A key claim is that these falsehoods
can play an epistemic enabling role in the process of obtaining understanding but are not
elements of the explanations or analyses that constitute the content of understanding.
1 a puzzling fact
Prima facie, understanding is factive: its content can only contain true propositions (or
at least approximations to the truth). If I seem to understand a phenomenon but it
turns out that my account of the phenomenon contains false propositions, one would
say that it looked as if I understood it, but I actually did not. Yet, science is replete with
falsehoods that are considered to foster or facilitate understanding rather than prevent
it. Examples of such falsehoods range from smoothed curves to heavily idealized
models. Due to their utility, Catherine Elgin calls such falsehoods ‘felicitous’ (2007,
p. 39). The falsehoods in question are not just felicitous but they are also considered to
be legitimate. It is not bad scientific practice to employ such falsehoods. Quite to the
contrary, Elgin argues that such falsehoods facilitate understanding not despite but
by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are: “[...] their divergence from truth or
representational accuracy fosters their epistemic functioning” (2017, p. 1, my italics).
Below, this claim is fleshed out in more detail. Taking it for granted for the moment,
we are faced with the following puzzling fact:
a puzzling fact There are legitimate falsehoods that epistemically facilitate under-
standing of phenomena by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are.
In view of this fact, Elgin maintains that there are just three main options when it
comes to the factivity of understanding (2017, p. 15):
Our predicament is this: We can retain the truth requirement and construe science
either [(i)] as cognitively defective or [(ii)] as noncognitive, or [(iii)] we can reject,
revise, or relax the truth requirement and remain cognitivists about and devotees
of science.
Prima facie, options (i) and (ii) or rejecting any truth requirement seem unacceptable.
So-called quasi-factivism about understanding opts for relaxing the truth requirement.
The content of one’s understanding can contain falsehoods if they concern matters
that are peripheral to understanding the phenomenon in question (e.g., Kvanvig 2003;
Mizrahi 2012) or if most propositions of the content are true (Rice 2016). I call this the
weak non-factive view of understanding. According to the strong non-factive view of
understanding (short: non-factivism), we need to revise the truth requirement. The
content of one’s understanding can contain falsehoods that are central to understanding
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the phenomenon (e.g., Elgin 2007, 2017; de Regt 2015, 2017; Potochnik 2017, Rancourt
2017).
There are three main attempts to dissolve the predicament and to resist a non-
factive view. According to the non-difference-maker view, felicitous falsehoods turn
out to be harmless; they point to factors that do not make a significant (explanatory)
difference to the phenomenon understood (e.g., Strevens 2008, ch. 8, 2017; Khalifa 2017,
ch. 6.3.2; cf. also M. Elgin and Sober 2002). An alternative attempt is to re-consider the
objects of understanding; what is factively understood is what the respective falsehoods
mean or their relation to the phenomenon (e.g., Greco 2014). Yet another attempt
is to argue that the value of the falsehoods is non-epistemic; the falsehoods are just
convenient for practical purposes such as calculation (e.g., Sullivan and Khalifa 2018).
All these attempts rebut or substantially weaken the puzzling fact about felicitous
falsehoods. According to the non-difference-maker view, the falsehoods do not
substantially contribute to the content of understanding, i.e., the systematic account
of the phenomenon of interest (which is arguably concerned with the difference-
makers). Shifting the object of understanding amounts to denying that the phenomena
themselves can be understood based on the falsehoods. And arguing that the value of
falsehoods is non-epistemic amounts to denying that understanding is epistemically
facilitated by the falsehoods.
In this paper, I offer an alternative proposal to dissolve the predicament and to
resist a non-factive view of understanding in view of felicitous falsehoods that fully
accommodates the puzzling fact.2 I dub this view the extraction view. I proceed as
follows: In section 2, I characterize felicitous legitimate falsehoods in more detail.
A first key step in my proposal is to loosen the link between two often conflated
things (sect. 3): I argue that the question how these falsehoods are related to the
phenomena of interest (relation question) and the question how the falsehoods figure
into the content of understanding the phenomena (content question) are independent
of each other. One can figure into the content of an epistemic achievement by enabling
that achievement or by being an element of its content. According to quasi-factivism,
felicitous legitimate falsehoods figure into the content of understanding by being
elements of its periphery. According to non-factivism, they figure into it by being
elements of its core. My second key step is to argue that facts from science speak against
both positions (sect. 4, 5). In section 6, I turn to my third key step. I draw lessons
from works by Anna Alexandrova (2008), Christopher Pincock (2014), Alisa Bokulich
(2016), and Collin Rice (2016, 2018) to argue that felicitous legitimate falsehoods merely
enable understanding but are not an element of its content. When working with such
2 I do not address any other arguments against factivism, such as arguments from history against factivism,
according to which scientists gained understanding based on theories which turned out to be false (see,
e.g., de Regt 2015, 2017). For a discussion, see, e.g., Khalifa 2017, ch. 6.2.
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falsehoods only the truths we extract from them are elements of the content of our
understanding. Felicitous legitimate falsehoods are not more nor less than fruitful
tools to obtain this information. In section 7, I turn the final step in my proposal. I argue
that the extraction view is perfectly compatible with the thesis that such falsehoods
have an epistemic value by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are. For instance,
they might provide us with epistemic access to relevant information for understanding
the phenomenon. So, according to my view, the process of obtaining understanding might
be rife with falsehoods, but not the understanding obtained.
2 felicitous legitimate falsehoods
A variety of falsehoods figure into scientific inquiry.3 Some of these happen by accident.
Scientists make mistakes, such as accidentally reporting false numbers, miscalculating,
or confusing substances in a chemical experiment. Other falsehoods are what Michael
Strevens calls ‘deliberate falsehoods’ (2017, p. 37). Scientists deliberately employ such
falsehoods and do not believe them to be true; they are known to be (slightly or
utterly) false. Among these falsehoods are illegitimate ones, such as fabricated results
or distorted statistical values. Elgin provides a plausible explanation why these are
illegitimate. She argues that the propositions that figure into a scientific account of
something do not only need to have a tether to the facts; a “tie to evidence is crucial. For
evidence supplies the grounding that underwrites epistemic standing” (2017, p. 132).
Claims without evidence are not trustworthy. We need acceptance for understanding
and evidence for acceptance. Fabricated results are thus not legitimate falsehoods.
Yet, there are also a vast number of deliberate falsehoods that are considered to be
legitimate. Some are the result of streamlining or pruning collected data, like a smoothed
curve of data points gained by ignoring outliers. Some are generalizations derived
from idealized models, such as the ideal gas law, which implies that the volume and
temperature of gases are directly proportional to each other when their pressure is
held constant. Some are the stipulations that figure into idealized models, such as the
stipulation that gas molecules exert no long range forces on each other or that the
number of particles is arbitrarily large.4 In some cases, the divergence from truth is
negligible, such as describing nearly round objects as round. We need not worry about
such a divergence. Scientists typically have to trade off precision against other values
3 I do not use the term ‘idealization’ as an umbrella term for these falsehoods because it might be too
narrow. Some scientific falsehoods are claimed to be fictions rather than idealizations (see, e.g., Godfrey-
Smith 2009; Frigg 2010; Bokulich 2012; Sugden 2013). And idealizations are often distinguished from
abstractions (see, e.g., Jones 2005) or approximations (see, e.g., Norton 2012). For more on idealizations
see, e.g., Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014; Potochnik 2017.
4 Another interesting case are falsehoods involved in hypothetical reasoning, such as scientific thought
experiments or how-possibly models. I do not consider their characteristics in this paper; but see,
e.g., Dray 1957; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013; Rohwer and Rice 2013; Sugden 2013; Bokulich 2014; van Riel 2015;
Verreault-Julien 2019.
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like generality. Approximately correct descriptions can also be preferred when they
simplify calculation, reasoning, etc.5 I assume that approximately correct descriptions
are compatible with a factive view of understanding. In other cases, the divergence
from truth provides a more distorting picture of the phenomenon of interest, such
as assuming that the number of particles in a fluid is arbitrarily large. For a factive
view of understanding, such utterly false falsehoods seem to be especially worrisome.
These are the falsehoods I focus on in what follows.
What makes these described distorting falsehoods legitimate? One main reason is
that they are often empirically and robustly successful:
[T]hese equations [i.e., the Navier-Stokes equations] are extremely safe [...]. By
‘safety,’ here we mean that one can employ these equations quite successfully in
engineering context such as pipeline construction, airplane and ship design, and
so on. (Batterman and Rice 2014, p. 357, my italics)
The results [i.e., a match of the model’s prediction with the collected data] showed
that the observed patterns of foraging behavior were best predicted by the optimality
model [...]. (Rice 2018, p. 2804, my italics)
[...] because of systematic, successful prediction. [...] the behavior of gases usu-
ally agrees with the predictions of the Ideal Gas Law within certain ranges of
temperature and pressures. (Mizrahi 2012, p. 251, my italics).
[...] the behavior of a pendulum over a long timescale can be derived to an arbitrary
degree of accuracy using one of several singular perturbation techniques. (Wayne
2011, p. 836, my italics)
This remarkably simple model does, in fact, recover a host of features observed
in real fluids at these large continuum scales. [...] The result will accurately
reproduce many of the macroscopic features of fluid flow. (Batterman and Rice
2014, p. 358, my italics)
So, the empirical success contributes to the required tie to evidence. Because they
can provide quite accurate results or recover the features of interest, the idealized
equations and the false stipulations involved in models ought to be taken seriously.6
But importantly, distorting falsehoods need not be empirically successful to be consid-
ered legitimate. The potentiality of empirical success can be enough. Scientists typically
employ distorting falsehoods based on educated guesses about which aspects of a
phenomenon they can fruitfully distort. When the model or equation that utilizes
5 It goes without saying that the notion ‘approximately’ is context-sensitive. One has to specify a
proximity range for the value of interest. A value is significantly different if it is not equivalent to the
value of interest or within its specified proximity.
6 Models are typically not identified as falsehoods for at least two reasons. On the one hand, many
models are not something that could be true or false. On the other hand, models typically also involve
accurate stipulations about their target phenomena.
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them cannot accommodate the measured data, it is typically improved or replaced
(for the purposes in question). Take the case of the optical Glauber model. It predicts
that the collision of two nuclei results in the formation of an ellipsoid based on the
idealization that nuclei are perfect spheres of energy. Measurements showed that
these collisions result not only in ellipsoids, but other shapes as well. In the light
of this observation, the Monte Carlo Glauber model was invented, which does not
employ the perfect sphere idealization. So, falsehoods it can be legitimate to propose
and theorize with are only potentially empirically successful. However, the (potential)
empirical success is not sufficient for a falsehood to be legitimate.7 We need what I call
an appropriate tie to the phenomenon. How is the falsehood related to the phenomenon?
Why are we justified in exploring the phenomenon of interest with the falsehood (or
something that involves it)?
From now on, I reserve the term ‘legitimate falsehoods’ for falsehoods that are
potentially empirically successful and have an appropriate tie to the phenomenon. And
I reserve the term ‘felicitous legitimate falsehoods’ for legitimate falsehoods that are
in fact successful. It is these falsehoods that are at center of the debate about factivism
about understanding.
But what is an ‘appropriate tie’ to the phenomenon and what does it imply for the
factivity of understanding? I address this issue in what follows.
3 phenomena , falsehoods , understanding : two separate questions
The project of establishing an appropriate tie to the phenomenon of interest is crucial.
I call one key question it addresses the relation question:
relation question How do the falsehoods (or the models that involve them) relate
to the phenomenon in question?
Answering this question involves answering a couple of closely related questions.
One question is whether and, if applicable, how falsehoods or the idealized models
that involve them represent the phenomenon in question. Many accounts address this
question. Some argue that models are not mundane representations but rather akin
to fiction (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 2009; Frigg 2010; Toon 2012). Others emphasize the
role of the model users. For instance, Mauricio Sua´rez argues for an inferential account,
according to which the model must allow its users to draw inferences regarding
the phenomenon (2002). Tarja Knuuttila argues that models are essentially epistemic
artefacts, which are used to answer the users’ questions (2011). And Elgin (e.g., 2007,
2017, ch. 9-12) as well as Roman Frigg and James Nguyen (e.g., 2018) argue that the
relation between the falsehoods (or the models) and the phenomenon of interest is
that of representation-as (following Hughes 1997). For instance, gases are represented
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
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as ideal gases for a particular purpose. Among other things, for X to represent Y as
something, X must exemplify features of Y; X functions “[...] as a symbol that makes
reference to some of the properties, patterns, or relations it instantiates” (Elgin 2017,
p. 184). For instance, a sample card colored with ‘grayish green’ ink exemplifies that
color. Similarly, falsehoods (or models) can exemplify, say, structural properties, such
as the direct proportional relation between the volume and temperature of gases when
their pressure is held constant.
Another closely related (and sometimes conflated) question is by virtue of what
we are justified in using such falsehoods. Elay Shech describes this question as follows,
focusing on so-called essential idealizations (EI) (2013, p. 1178, my italics):
We need an account of how our abstract and essentially idealized scientific repre-
sentations correspond to the concrete systems observed in the world, we need a
characterization of EI, and a justification for appealing to EIs [...].
The demand for a justification for appealing to falsehoods is also addressed by
several scholars (e.g., McMullin 1985; M. Elgin and Sober 2002; Weisberg 2007; Strevens
2008; Bokulich 2011; Batterman and Rice 2014, Rice 2018; Elgin 2017; Potochnik 2017).
For instance, as we saw, M. Elgin, Sober, and Strevens argue that we are justified in
appealing to falsehoods when they point to non-difference-makers. Rice proposes
that the model’s system being in the same universality class as the system of interest
justifies exploring the latter with the former (2018). For Bokulich, the justificatory
step is concerned with specifying the model’s application domain and showing that
the phenomenon of interest falls within that domain (2011, p. 39). Elgin argues that
we are justified in using the falsehoods in question precisely because they exemplify
properties. An exemplar can exemplify features that are otherwise difficult to discern.
When it does, the exemplar affords epistemic access to those properties. She argues that
felicitous falsehoods give epistemic access to rather obscured features by distorting
the phenomenon of interest (2017, ch. 11-12).8 This justifies using them.
It goes without saying that these and related accounts deserve an in-depth evalua-
tion. But this is not my aim. The questions these accounts address are not directly
concerned with the factivity of understanding.9 The relation question and its project
of establishing an appropriate tie between the falsehoods and the phenomenon of
interest need to be separated from the project which is at the heart of the debate about
the factivity of understanding, namely the project of establishing how felicitous legitimate
falsehoods figure into the content of understanding the phenomena. I call the key question
this project addresses the content question:
8 Frigg and Nguyen’s representation-as account differs in at least one important respect. According
to them, the properties exemplified by a model are typically not the ones that are imputed to the
phenomena of interest (2018, p. 217). They propose a detailed account of how the exemplified properties
are related to the imputed ones via so-called specification keys (cf. 2018, sect. 5-7).
9 For more on these and other accounts see, e.g., Sua´rez 2010; Downes 2011; Frigg and Hartmann 2012.
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content question How do the falsehoods (or the models that involve them) figure
into the content of understanding the phenomenon?
This question addresses how we can understand something by employing obviously
false assumptions about it. The content question matters when it comes to the factivity
debate. The relation question, taken by itself, does not.
It goes without saying that the relation question and the content question can be
closely related. One could argue that answers to the content question can piggyback
on answers to the relation question. For instance, the non-difference-maker view
essentially gives the same answer to the question ‘How do the falsehoods relate to
the phenomenon of interest?’ and ‘How do the falsehoods figure into the content of
understanding the phenomenon?’: They point to things that do not make a difference
to the phenomenon.10
But although these questions are closely related, the first key step towards my
extraction view is to argue that the relation question and the content question enjoy
a crucial independence. They are independent for at least four reasons: First, the
question whether and how a falsehood represents the phenomenon can be also posed
for unsuccessful or illegitimate falsehoods. The relation question can always be asked.
Second, by contrast, we only wonder about a falsehood’s role for the content of
understanding once it is at least empirically successful. For instance, Elgin emphasizes
that not every exemplifying falsehood provides understanding. A tether to the facts
is required, too (2017, ch. 11). Third, addressing the relation question can explain
why the falsehoods are empirically successful. Answers to the content question
need not address this question. Fourth, answering how a falsehood represents (or
does not represent) the phenomenon does not necessitate an answer as to whether or
how the falsehood enters the content of understanding. Successfully representing a
phenomenon (or being a fiction thereof, etc.) is not sufficient for being an element of a
systematic account of that phenomenon. For instance, my blue hat might exemplify
the Atlantic ocean’s blue on a sunny day. But this is not sufficient for the blue hat
playing any role in the content of my understanding the ocean’s features.
Relatedly, one should keep apart the epistemic commitment a scientist has towards
a falsehood or model while using it and the epistemic commitment involved in
successfully understanding a phenomenon. A scientist might accept a falsehood for
the sake of exploring a phenomena. But this does not mean that they accept that
falsehood for understanding the phenomenon in question.
The extraction view I propose below exploits the independence of the content ques-
tion from the relation question. It is compatible with different answers to the relation
10 Some variants of the inferential account conflate these questions when it comes to explanation (see, e.g.,
Kennedy 2012, Jebeile and Kennedy 2015; Fang 2019). They would thus, arguably, also conflate them
when it comes to the content of understanding.
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question, including answers given by some non-factivists about understanding, such
as Elgin’s representation-as view. In what follows, I am thus exclusively concerned
with the project of establishing how the felicitous legitimate falsehoods figure into the
content of understanding phenomena. This project can also be phrased in terms of pro-
viding or conferring understanding. Another important step in my positive proposal is
to utilize the fact that there are least two substantially different ways to provide, confer,
or figure into the content of an epistemic achievement: to enable that achievement and
to be an element of its content. As I argue below, the claim that felicitous legitimate
falsehoods play an (epistemic) enabling role for understanding is compatible with
factivism about understanding. But the claim that they are elements of its content is
not. This stronger claim is what quasi-factivism and non-factivism insist on. In the
following two sections, I argue that facts from science speak against it. This is the
second key step in my proposal.
4 felicitous legitimate falsehoods and quasi-factivism
According to quasi-factivism, the systematic account that comprises one’s understand-
ing can contain falsehoods as elements, as long as they are in the periphery of the
account (cf., e.g., Kvanvig 2003; Mizrahi 2012) or if most propositions in the account
are true (Rice 2016). Let us first consider the periphery view. The periphery of an
account is made of propositions that are peripheral to the subject matter in question.
For instance, that my hat is blue is peripheral to its size. Or think of peripheral vision.
Moti Mizrahi illustrates the periphery view with the much discussed example of the
ideal gas law, which implies that the volume and temperature of gases are directly
proportional to each other when their pressure is held constant.11
pV = nRT (1)
p is a variable for pressure, V for volume, T for temperature, n for the number of
gas moles, and R is a constant. Normal gases approximately behave according to this
law in particular conditions, such as when the temperature of a gas is not close to its
liquefaction point. The ideal gas law is derived from a number of propositions. Some
of them are utterly false, such as the assumptions that gas molecules do not collide
and that they do not exert any long range forces on each other, etc. (for details see,
e.g., Strevens 2008, ch. 8; Rice 2019, sect. 3.1). Mizrahi claims that these falsehoods are
only peripheral to understanding the gases’ behavior (2012, p. 245):
11 This law is a combination of Boyle’s law, Charles’s law, Gay-Lussac’s law, and Avogadro’s law. There
are more refined forms of the law, such as the van der Waals equation, but the differences do not matter
for my purposes.
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[...] although the idealizing assumptions [...] are necessary for the derivation of
the gas laws, they do not define the behavior of ideal gases. It is the equation
pV = nRT that defines the behavior of ideal gases.
So, according to Mizrahi, only the resulting law is an element of the core of one’s
understanding content. The premises of its derivation basis are peripheral elements.
An understanding that contains the ideal gas law is factive insofar as the law is
approximately true for gases in particular conditions. It is only quasi-factive “[..]
because scientists have to make idealizing assumptions [in the periphery], which may
be false, strictly speaking, in order to derive the Ideal Gas Law” (2012, p. 251).
Let us bracket for a moment whether Mizrahi is right that all idealizing assumptions
can be located in the derivation of the ideal gas law. Even if that were true, the first
major issue with the periphery view is that it is not convincing upon closer examination
for at least two reasons. First, it seems to be simply false that the derivation propositions
are merely part of the periphery. Any equation or law is examined with respect to
a given domain. One needs a domain restriction in order to determine whether a
law or equation is true, e.g., whether it is actually the case that pV = nRT. One
has to determine for each variable what its domain is. The derivation propositions
contribute to determining this domain. The ideal gas law is only true for gases whose
molecules do not collide, do not exert any long range forces on each other, etc. So,
the propositions that Mizrahi locates in the periphery are in fact central to the law’s
application.
Second and relatedly, the law itself does not seem to be an element of the content
of scientific understanding. Strictly speaking, the law is not applicable to real-world
gases (for a similar point see, e.g., Cartwright 1983, part 3). Gases like methane simply
do not consist of molecules that do not collide. Why do scientists nonetheless work
with the ideal gas law? It is not because they think that the law applies to them.
Instead, they use it for comparisons; they compare the behavior of a so-called ideal or
perfect gas with the measurement results from normal gases. Here is a quote from a
textbook (Massey and Ward-Smith 2006, p. 17):
The assumed properties of a perfect gas are closely matched by those of actual
gases in many circumstances, although no actual gas is perfect. The molecules of a
perfect gas would behave like tiny, perfectly elastic spheres in random motion, and
would influence one another only when they collided. Their total volume would
be negligible in comparison with the space in which they moved. From these
hypotheses the kinetic theory of gases indicates that, for equilibrium conditions,
the absolute pressure p, the volume V occupied by mass m, and the absolute
temperature T are related by the expression pV = nRT. [...] Most gases, if
at temperatures and pressures well away both from the liquid phase and from
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dissociation, obey this relation closely and so their pressure, density and (absolute)
temperature may, to a good approximation, be related by [the equation].
So, scientists examine how closely normal gases match the ideal gas law. The
law is not applied to the gases, strictly speaking. What follows for the content of
understanding, say, normal gases’ pressure-volume-temperature relation? It does not
follow that the law itself is an element of it. Clearly, a physicist does not commit to
the proposition that normal gases behave according to the ideal gas law. At best, they
commit to a comparison, e.g., that normal gases conform to the ideal gas law to a
good approximation. This result supports factivism because the comparison is true.
Before I turn to the second major issue with the periphery view, let me observe
that Mizrahi seems to echo my interpretation. He claims (2012, p. 247):
[...] we can attribute to scientists who use the Ideal Gas Law understanding that
is factive because the objects of their understanding involve statements of the
form ‘Gas g behaves approximately like an ideal gas under conditions C’ (where
C specifies conditions of temperature, pressure, and the like) and ‘Gas g deviates
from ideal-gas behavior under conditions C*’.
But if that is his view, it is a factive rather than a quasi-factive view. As he notes
himself, these comparisons are true (2012, p. 248). And for such comparisons the
derivation propositions are simply irrelevant. They are only relevant for deriving the
law but not for the truth of the comparisons. There is thus no need for including
the derivation propositions in the periphery of one’s understanding account at all.
However, I set these considerations aside and continue to interpret Mizrahi as offering
a proper quasi-factivist view.
So far, I bracketed the question whether all idealizing assumptions can be located
in the derivation basis. The second major issue with the periphery view is that they
cannot. There are cases where the idealizing assumptions are either directly involved in
the equations or laws or are otherwise indispensable for them. Let us go back to the
seemingly innocent ideal gas law. Rice shows in detail that pressure and temperature
are statistical variables that are defined within an idealized statistical framework (2019,
sect. 3.1). So, upon closer examination, there are idealized assumptions involved in the
law itself and not only in its derivation basis. Another example illustrates this issue in
a more direct way. Take one of the equations comprising the ‘Lotka-Volterra’ model,
which is used for analyzing predator-prey dynamics:
dx
dt
= αx− βxy (2)
x is a variable for the number of prey, y for the number of a particular predator
population, dxdt stands for the growth rate of the prey population per unit time t. αx
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stands for the exponential growth rate the prey population would have if it was not
being preyed upon, and βxy stands for the rate of predation upon the prey. It is
assumed to be proportional to the rate at which predators and prey meet. So, roughly
speaking, the equation states that changes in the prey population’s number is the
population’s growth rate minus the rate at which it is preyed upon. The equation
provides approximately correct results for the relation between the size of a prey
population (say, rabbits) and the size of its predator population (say, foxes). Together
with the equation for the predator population, the Lotka-Volterra model predicts cyclic
population developments that are somewhat similar to the population developments
observed in real-world predator-prey populations. The equation contains the expo-
nential growth rate idealization α. According to it, the prey population reproduces
exponentially when not preyed upon. This is an utterly false falsehood. Real-world
prey populations would not have an exponential growth rate even if they were not
preyed upon. The periphery strategy cannot be applied to such cases. According to
that strategy, only the equation matters but not its derivation propositions. But in this
case the falsehood is not hidden in derivation propositions. It is an element of the
equation. An advocate of the periphery view could deny that any understanding can
be gained working with such models. However, the case does not seem to be much
different than the ideal gas law case. We have an empirically successful equation. If
understanding is gained, the predicament for the periphery view is this: Either the
understanding’s content contains a central falsehood, which is incompatible with the
periphery view. Or, again, only true comparisons are an element of the content, such
as ‘The population development in recent fox-rabbit population in the US is similar to
the cyclic development of ideal predator-prey populations.’ If so, there is no need for
a periphery quasi-factive view. These comparisons are true.
One might argue that the falsehoods contained in the equations or laws or in their
derivation propositions could simply be replaced with a so-called veridical counterpart
(Strevens 2008, p. 300). A veridical counterpart of a falsehood correctly describes the
respective properties.12 Strevens proposes that one would get approximately the same
application results if one were to replace the distorting falsehoods with their veridical
counterparts (similarly M. Elgin and Sober 2002, p. 448; Rohwer and Rice 2013, p. 338).
But even if this strategy worked in some cases, it does not work for all. There are
several idealized models that involve indispensable falsehoods at their core. Following
Rohwer and Rice (2016, p. 1134), I consider a falsehood indispensable
[...] when removing the [falsehood] has the effect of ‘destroying’ or ‘dismantling’
the model; e.g. when the [falsehood] is essential to the model’s mathematical
representation of the target phenomenon.
12 There is more than one veridical counterpart for every distorting falsehood. For instance, the collision
frequency of gas molecules can be described to varying degrees of accuracy.
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At least given our scientific resources and mathematics, it is claimed to be impossi-
ble in these cases to get similar (or even any) application results based on veridical
counterparts. Several case studies illustrate that models featuring indispensable false-
hoods are ubiquitous in science (e.g., Wayne 2011; Bokulich 2011; Kennedy 2012;
Batterman 2009, Batterman and Rice 2014, Rice 2018, 2019). In this paper, I do not
evaluate these studies. I assume that they are empirically accurate. Let me just give
you two brief illustrating examples. One popular example are idealized models that
employ the so-called thermodynamic limit (e.g., Batterman 2002; Batterman and Rice
2014, Rice 2018). Roughly speaking, it assumes that the number of particles of the sys-
tem as well as its volume are arbitrary large. Models that employ the thermoydynamic
limit are, for instance, so-called phase-transition models. Phase transitions are abrupt
changes of the qualitative macroscopic properties of a system or substance, such as
water’s freezing into ice, the transition from liquid to gas, or the magnetization of
iron. The thermodynamic limit is said to be indispensable because the phenomenon
of a phase transition cannot be produced with a model that assumes finite particles.
By employing finite systems, say, systems based on statistical mechanics, we cannot
model phase transitions.13 So, it seems that we cannot explore the nature of phase
transitions without the thermodynamic limit.
Another popular example are so-called optimality or optimization models (cf. Rice
2012, Rice 2018, sect. 3.2; but also M. Elgin and Sober 2002, pp. 446-448; Potochnik 2007,
2009, 2010). The basic goal of such models is to analyze why particular phenotypic
traits occur by determining optimal strategies for obtaining, say, net energy intake,
given a set of limiting factors such as the costs of finding food. As Rice shows, such
models do not only involve numerous idealizations but idealizations that are entrenched
with each other (which renders them indispensable) (2018, 2019). One of Rice’s cases
is an optimality model of the foraging behavior of arctic wintering eiders (a kind
of duck). The patterns that result from the model’s application are quite similar to
the patterns observed for the real-world eiders’ foraging behavior. So, there is the
desired empirical success. This model stipulates, among other things, that the eider
population is arbitrarily large, that there is no intergenerational overlap, that the
selection pressure in the eider population remains constant, and that natural selection
is the only evolutionary factor that matters for the phenotypic trait’s evolution (cf. Rice
2018, sect. 3.2). Importantly, “[...] the contributions made by the idealizations cannot
be quarantined from the contributions made by the accurate parts of the model” (Rice
2018, p. 2808). Only the entrenched contributions allow us to produce the matching
behaviors. Thereby, the idealizations become indispensable.
13 Some argue that the thermodynamic limit is dispensable (e.g., Butterfield 2011; Norton 2012). For some
useful discussion see, e.g., Shech 2013, 2017. I take for granted that it is necessary.
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For none of these cases and the previous ones does the periphery view work.
One cannot put the distorting falsehoods into the periphery. If understanding is
gained, an understanding’s content contains either the falsehoods as elements or true
comparisons utilizing them. So, cases of indispensable falsehoods either speak in favor
of non-factivism or factivism, but not in favor of the periphery view.
To sum up, on the one hand, the periphery view seems to be doubly mistaken: (i)
the derivation propositions are not merely in the periphery and (ii) the law is not an
element of an understanding’s content. On the other hand, the periphery view cannot
account for cases featuring falsehoods in the equations or indispensable falsehoods.
There is another quasi-factive view, namely Rice’s view according to which only
most propositions of our understanding’s content need to be true.14 But, upon closer
examination, Rice’s analysis of felicitious legitimate falsehoods does not demand a quasi-
factive view. Rice considers two idealized models. For each of them, he argues
something along the following lines (2016, p. 88, my italics):
The goal of system-specific modeling is to provide accurate information about the
counterfactual relevance and irrelevance of various contextually salient features
within the model’s target system. [...] This information about counterfactual
relevance and irrelevance then leads the modeler to acquire factive scientific under-
standing of why the phenomenon occurred in the target system. This understand-
ing is constituted by a set of true beliefs about the counterfactual relevance and
irrelevance of various contextually salient factors [...].
So, according to Rice, true information is obtained working with felicitous legiti-
mate falsehoods. The only ground for counting his view as quasi-factive is that the
accurate information “[...] is incorporated into a larger body of mostly true scientific
knowledge about the phenomenon of interest” (2016, p. 88, my italics). However, the
issue of integrating the accurate information into something else is not concerned
with the role of the falsehoods for the content of one’s understanding. So, from the
perspective of felicitous legitimate falsehoods, Rice’s view is compatible with factivism.
It goes without saying that there might be other grounds for arguing that the larger
account contains some falsehoods. But I am exclusively concerned with the argument
from felicitous falsehoods against factivism in this paper.
The overall upshot is that if felicitous legitimate falsehoods were elements of an
understanding’s content, they would not be elements of its periphery. They would
rather be elements of its core. In what follows, I argue that facts from science also
speak against this claim.
14 Rice considers his view to be a form of factivism (2016). However, I use the term ‘factivism’ exclusively
for views that demand that all propositions be true.
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5 felicitous legitimate falsehoods and non-factivism
Non-factivism does not take issue with central or indispensable falsehoods. For
instance, according to Elgin’s view, such falsehoods can be a central element of the
account that constitutes the content of scientific understanding: “Felicitous falsehoods,
on my theory, are integral to tenable accounts. They are not merely causal antecedents”
(2017, p. 97). For instance, “[...] ecological models of population size embody an
understanding of the dynamics of population regulation” (2017, p. 42; similary de
Regt and Gijsbers 2017; Rancourt 2017). However, non-factivism is not the view that
the content of one’s understanding can only contain false propositions. As Elgin puts
it, “[...] understanding somehow answers to facts” (2017, p. 37) – in whatever way
precisely. It is just not true that “all or most of the [central] propositional commitments
that comprise a genuine understanding are true” (2017, p. 37). Non-factivism is mainly
argued for by pointing to the fact that felicitous legitimate falsehoods are frequently
employed in science, that they play an important role for scientific progress, and that
many idealizations cannot be de-idealized without loss of empirical success. Elgin
sums up (2017, p. 35):
As we have seen, many epistemically estimable accounts contain models and
idealizations that do not even purport to be true.
Indeed, it is true that scientists frequently employ models and idealizations that
do not even purport to be true or could not be replaced with veridical counterparts.
However, this fact is not sufficient for concluding that the falsehoods are elements of
the content of the understanding obtained by working with them. As I have argued
before, the content question enjoys independence from the relation question. We
need a positive argument for why the fact that scientific accounts involve falsehoods
warrants that these are elements of the core of one’s understanding’s account.
To argue against non-factivism, one could try to diminish the role of the falsehoods
for the scientific accounts or for the understanding obtained. But this is not my ap-
proach. I embrace Elgin’s claim that “[...] the ideal gas law figures in the understanding
provided by thermodynamics [...]” (2017, p. 61). However, the crucial question is how
they figure into our understanding. Figuring into an epistemic achievement does not
mean one is an element of its content. As I emphasized before, one could also figure
into it by playing an enabling role. In the next section, I argue for such an enabling
view. In this section, I provide arguments against the claim that the falsehoods figure
into one’s understanding by being an element of its content by pointing to three facts
from scientific practice that conflict with this claim.
The first fact from scientific practice is that scientists themselves are aware of the fact
that the felicitous legitimate falsehoods are false; they are deliberate falsehoods. Recall
the textbook quote. It was clear that the ideal gas law is concerned with a ‘perfect’
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or ‘ideal’ gas and that normal gases are not such gases. Pincock describes models
that involve the falsehood that the ocean is infinitely deep (2014). This falsehood is
also not considered to be true. Relatedly, as I have pointed out before, the falsehoods
are typically not applicable to the phenomena of interest. The ideal gas law applies to
‘ideal’ gases and optimality models to ‘optimal’ organisms. It does not seem to be
plausible that a scientist’s understanding of a phenomenon is comprised of an account
containing something that is known to be false of it and known to be not applicable to it.
After all, understanding is an epistemic commitment to the account. This argument
from deliberate falsehoods is strengthened by the fact that if the deliberate falsehoods
were elements of one’s understanding’s account, any understanding subject would
face a clash of contradictory epistemic commitments. The felicitous deliberate falsehoods
with which we are concerned in this paper are not just utterly false, but they also
contradict known properties of the real-world entities. An understanding subject would
have to accept at the same time that the ocean is infinitely deep and not infinitely deep,
that the particles of the phenomenon of interest are both arbitrarily large and finitely
large, etc. In view of these plain contradictions, Shech concludes with respect to the
Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect that “[...] [the infinity idealization is] not essential for the
explanation and understanding of the manifestation of the concrete, physical AB effect”
(2017, p. 10). In general, explaining or understanding phenomena does not seem to
be compatible with contradictory propositions about the phenomena. It is also not
clear to me how Elgin’s account can cope with these contradictions. According to her,
“[a] tenable [understanding] account is a tapestry of interconnected commitments that
collectively constitute an understanding of a domain” (2017, p. 16). It seems difficult
to imagine that such plain contradictions can fit into a complex of interconnected
epistemic commitments, especially in light of the fact that Elgin additionally claims
that these commitments involve the disposition to act on the content one commits to
(cf. 2017, ch. 2).
One might object that deliberate falsehoods are professed in scientific practice and
thereby become an element of the account. What is professing? According to Elgin,
“[...] to profess that p is [...] to make p available to function as a premise or rule of
inference in a given context for a given cognitive purpose” (2017, p. 21). It might
be reasonable to assume that scientists profess or accept a falsehood for the sake of
working with it (see also Potochnik 2017, ch. 4.1.1). They act as if it were true. However,
this objection is not convincing. Even if something is professed, it does not thereby
become an element of someone’s account of a phenomenon. Take a different case: In
reductio ad absurdum arguments, the claim to be defended is negated as a supposition.
The very point of such arguments is that the claim of interest should be accepted
because its negation would be untenable. The negation is professed but not integrated
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into one’s account of the phenomenon. Professing that p, taken by itself, thus does not
require integrating p into one’s account.
The second fact from scientific practice supports the first argument. It is not
uncommon to use several idealized models for exploring the same phenomenon.
Michael Weisberg calls such cases ‘multiple-models idealizations’ (2007). For instance,
apart from the ideal gas law, there is the van der Waals equation and the virial equation
for modeling gases’ pressure-volume-temperature relation. All of them are employed
in science (including the heavily idealized ideal gas law). Not uncommonly, these
models are contradictory idealized models. A common example are models used for
analyzing water. Some construe water as a continuous fluid and others construe it
as composed of discrete particles. All these models are employed to examine the
features of water, although it is impossible for the employed distorting idealizations
to be true at the same time. Water cannot be a continuous fluid and composed of
discrete particles. While these are cases where scientists switch between models, there
are also cases where a model contains incompatible sub-models. For instance, some
multi-scalar models model fluids differently at different density scales. Elgin argues
that multiple-models idealization is not an issue because “[e]ach model exemplifies
different features and affords epistemic access to different aspects of the target” (2017,
p. 267).15 I agree that this modeling practice is legitimate. However, if so, it clearly
does not seem to be plausible that all central falsehoods involved in these multiple
models are elements of one’s understanding of the phenomena. This might lead to an
even bigger clash of commitments. Scientists neither believe that water is a continuous
fluid nor that it is composed of discrete particles. Assuming that they commit to
both falsehoods in their understanding’s accounts in addition to believing that water
consists of molecules seems to be absurd. Even if one distinguishes the objects of
understanding relative to different aspects of the target phenomena examined, this
would not change my argument. The false assumptions about the nature of water are
not restricted to aspects of water but are concerned with its general properties.
But we need not just wonder about scientists’ commitments from the armchair.
Here is a quote from an essay on optimality models that appeared in Nature and was
written by two influential biologists (Parker and Smith 1990, p. 27, my italics):
[...] If, by this review, we could lay rest to the idea that the application of
optimization theory requires either that we assume, or that we attempt to prove,
that organism are optimal, we would be well satisfied. [...]
We distinguish between general models and specific models, though in reality
they form part of a continuum. General models have a heuristic function; they
give qualitative insights into the range and forms of solution for some common
15 For other explanations why scientists use multiple models for examining the same phenomenon see,
e.g., Morrison 1999; Bailer-Jones 2003; Weisberg 2007; Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014.
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biological problem. [...] Specific models are designed to be applied quantitatively
to specific species, and include parameters that can readily be measured. They
are often modified (more complex) versions of some general model, devised
specifically for comparison with a particular set of observations. If the predictions
of the model match the biological observations, we may hope that we have made
correct assumptions about the nature of adaptions.
Biologists do not assume that organisms behave optimally. This assumption just
serves to construct and test models. Importantly, if these are empirically successful
(e.g., matching predictions), it is still not concluded that the organisms behave optimally.
Instead, true propositions about the adaption mechanism are (hoped to be) inferred.
We return back to this point in the next section.
Independent of the ‘clash of epistemic commitments’ objection, there is another
general objection. The third fact from scientific practice is that scientists appreciate
the limited empirical success of felicitous legitimate falsehoods. As I mentioned
throughout the paper, they only approximately recover behaviors or only deliver ap-
proximately correct predictions. Take the ideal gas law. As Strevens emphasizes,
Boyle’s law “[...] does not hold exactly for any gas” (2008, p. 305).16 Rice claims that
“[...] many idealized model systems are known to approximate the patterns of behavior
of real-world systems [...]” (2018, p. 2812, my italics). Scientists are aware of these facts.
They typically do not gloss over the fact that the predictions are only approximately
accurate. Their understanding of the phenomena based on the falsehoods is thus
expected to involve an appreciation of the approximation. And this expectation is not
disappointed. Recall the textbook quote. It was emphasized that the ideal gas law can
only be considered to be a good approximation. In a paper on the foraging behavior
of honeybees, two optimality models are tested. The model that is considered to
be best is one where “[...] the predictions from the efficiency model do not differ
significantly from the observations [...]” (Schmid-Hempel et al. 1985, p. 63). The model
is not claimed to perfectly recover or predict the phenomenon. This suggests that
the falsehoods themselves are not elements of the account an understanding subject
commits her- or himself to. And, again, if a true comparison like ‘Phenomenon X
behaves approximately like falsehood F’ is part of the commitments, this speaks in
favor of factivism and not non-factivism.
Let me sum up: Non-factivism emphasizes that felicitous legitimate falsehoods
are ubiquitous in science. The upshot of my analysis is that they are nonetheless
not elements of the core (or, for that matter, the periphery) of an understanding’s
content. The fact that scientists know that they are utterly false, not applicable to the
16 This should not be surprising. It is precisely because idealized models involve distorting falsehoods
that they do not provide us with accurate results. For instance, the effect of collisions between gas
molecules has some effect on the behavior of the gas.
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phenomena, and only approximately match the observations, and that including them
into an understanding’s account would lead to contradictions, strongly suggests that
the falsehoods are not something an understanding subject commits to. But how then
do they figure into understanding? In what follows, I answer this question.
6 felicitous legitimate falsehoods and factivism
Given the importance of felicitous legitimate falsehoods for scientific progress, it seems
clear that they figure into scientific understanding, and that, at least in some cases,
they are indispensable for it. I promised a factive view that can account for these
and other central assumptions. In particular, I claimed that my view can account
for the assumptions that (i) felicitous legitimate falsehoods facilitate understanding
of phenomena, (ii) by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are, (iii) and in an
epistemically relevant way, and (iv) that they might be might be indispensable for
understanding. In what follows, I show how my view achieves this.
6.1 Four key steps
As I mentioned before, one key step towards my view was to separate the relation ques-
tion (How do the falsehoods relate to the phenomenon?) from the content question
(How do the falsehoods figure into the content of understanding the phenomenon?).
This separation opens up promising options for factivists about understanding. By
appealing to indispensable falsehoods, quasi-factivists and non-factivists about un-
derstanding typically argue that the link between veridical representation and under-
standing should be loosened (see, e.g., Elgin 2017; Rice 2018; de Regt 2015), agreeing
with Andrew Wayne’s verdict that “the close link hitherto assumed between successful
[i.e., verdical] representation and explanation should be loosened” (2011, p. 831; see
also, e.g., Batterman 2009, Batterman and Rice 2014, Rice 2016, Rice 2018; Kennedy
2012). But due to the independence of the relation question from the content question,
factivists can agree that this link should be loosened; they only need to additionally
argue that the close link hitherto assumed between representation and understanding
should be loosened.17 And this is what my factive view does, as I show below.
My second key step was to argue against the views that felicitous legitimate
falsehoods figure into an understanding’s content by being elements of its periphery
and core, respectively.
Now I turn to my third key step. It is twofold. Its first part is to exploit the
distinction between the process of obtaining understanding and the obtained understanding:
Facilitating understanding or figuring into it is not exhausted by being an element of
17 This argumentative step is also at the heart of Rice’s quasi-factivist view (2016). He argues that
accurately representing the real-world target system in question is not required for understanding.
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it. By playing an enabling role for understanding, one also facilitates or figures into to
it. Enabling understanding takes place in the process of obtaining understanding. Being
an element of the content (also) concerns the obtained understanding, i.e., the product
of that process. It goes without saying that there could be more or less understanding
of a phenomenon. But any ‘gradable’ account of understanding needs to specify a
minimal threshold for when some understanding is obtained.
Importantly, enabling something is independent of being an element of it. For
instance, my teaching can figure into my students’ successfully written exams by
training skills that enable them to write those exams, but my teaching is not an
element of the successfully written exams. My teaching figures into the success
but is not a constitutive part of it. Likewise, something can figure into obtaining
an understanding’s content without being an element of its content. According to
the view I defend, this is precisely the role felicitous legitimate falsehoods play. In
a nutshell, they function as tools that help us to build systematic accounts of the
phenomena of interest; they help us to extract relevant information. I thus dub it ‘the
extraction view’. This accounts for (i). Below, I go into its details.
The second part of my third key step is to argue that at least in current scientific
practice this extracted information turns out to be accurate information. This is the
factive part of my view. It draws from several case studies, as I show below.
In the subsequent section, I turn the final step in my proposal. I argue that the
extraction view is perfectly compatible with (ii)-(iv), namely that the falsehoods have
this enabling role by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are, that they facilitate
understanding in an epistemically relevant way, and that they might be indispensable.
The process-product distinction is crucial here. I argue that the falsehoods might be
ineliminable in the process of obtaining understanding but not for the understanding
obtained. This is fully compatible with factivism about understanding, which only
concerns the factivity of the content of understanding.18
6.2 The extraction view
A central claim of the extraction view is that felicitous legitimate falsehoods facilitate
understanding a phenomena by enabling us to extract information about it. For
instance, one works with the ideal gas law to extract information about normal gases.
The extraction view decouples representation and understanding. It is not by virtue
of representing the phenomena (or by being a relevant fiction, etc.) that felicitous
legitimate falsehoods contribute to the content of understanding that phenomenon.
What is contained in a scientific model and what a scientist commits to when attempt-
18 As Elgin emphasized in conversation, one might separately discuss whether the falsehoods figure into
the justification of the understanding’s contents. I do not consider this possibility here. But in light of
my arguments against non-factivism, I do not expect that this is the case.
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ing to understand a phenomenon based on it thus need not coincide. The extraction
view also decouples the justification that renders the falsehood legitimate from the
obtained understanding. For instance, being in the same universality class as the
phenomenon to be understood might justify using an idealized model to analyze
the phenomenon (cf., e.g., Batterman and Rice 2014, Rice 2018). But, according to
the extraction view, only the information acquired about the shared properties is an
element of an understanding’s account.
The arguments against quasi-factivism and non-factivism speak for such an extrac-
tion view. The fact that scientists are aware that the felicitous legitimate falsehoods
are utterly false and only provide approximately matching results speaks in favor of
the fact that they do not take them at their face value but extract information from
them due to their empirical success. The fact that scientists work with incompatible
idealized models for the same phenomenon (e.g., different water models) strongly
suggests that such models do not provide either individually or taken together an
account of the phenomenon to which the scientists commit. Instead they extract
information about different aspects of the phenomenon using the models.
The extraction view draws lessons from other views, although it differs from
them. For instance, the extraction view shares the decoupling of representation and
understanding with Knuuttila’s epistemic artefact view of idealized models (2011,
Knuuttila and Boon 2011), according to which the construction of idealized models
is best understood as the construction of a hypothetical entity that facilitates the
exploration of the phenomenon. However, an important difference is that the extraction
view is not to committed to any particular view about the representational nature of
the falsehoods or the models that involve them. It is neutral regarding the relation
question. For this reason, the extraction view also does not collapse into an inferential
representation account like Sua´rez (e.g., 2002), although it shares the idea that the
model users draw inferences from working with the model. Moreover, as I address
below, a couple of authors proposed that models can be used to extract particular
kinds of information. For instance, Rice proposed that idealized models enable us to
extract modal information about the phenomena of interest (Rice 2018). The extraction
view I propose embraces these views. But it is neither limited to a particular kind of
information that is extracted nor to idealized models.
In order to use the extraction view to defend the factivity of understanding, one
needs to argue that accurate information is extracted. My strategy is to utilize several
case studies of scientific falsehoods (e.g., Alexandrova 2008; Pincock 2014; Bokulich
2016; Rice 2016, 2018) and other facts about scientific practice to show that the
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information extracted from the falsehoods or models that facilitates understanding is
indeed accurate.19 Let me start by going back to the quote from Nature:
If the predictions of the model match the biological observations, we may hope
that we have made correct assumptions about the nature of adaptions.
Scientists make educated guesses when constructing falsehoods or idealized mod-
els. When these are empirically successful, this is meaningful. It seems that some
guesses were correct. But, as we have seen, it does not seem plausible to infer from
the empirical success that the model qua model captures the phenomenon correctly.
It contains elements known to be false. And this is also not the inference drawn by
scientists. Instead, they infer that they have made some correct assumptions. The
empirical success suggests that the falsehoods “[...] capture something that is right,”
as Reiss puts it (2012, p. 49). Bokulich advocates a view along these lines for so-called
scientific fictions. She states (2016, p. 261): “fictions can be an effective means by
which we can come to understand truths that would otherwise be difficult to grasp.”
According to the factive extraction view, it is this something that matters for the
content of understanding. When we work with deliberate falsehoods, we want to
extract accurate information about the phenomenon of interest. These pieces of infor-
mation are elements of an understanding’s account of the phenomenon, but not the
falsehoods themselves. Felicitous legitimate falsehoods are tools for arriving at the
relevant information. Elgin states that “[t]he ideal gas law accounts for the behavior
of gases by describing the behavior of a model gas [...]” (2017, p. 61). The extraction
view would state more carefully: The ideal gas law captures something that is true of
normal gases, namely that the volume and temperature are, approximately, directly
proportional when the pressure is held constant. This true information accounts for
the property of normal gases.
The case studies reveal that there is a variety of extraction methods or results when
extracting true information using falsehoods. In this paper, I do not add any novel
extraction methods. The extraction view is not limited to any specific ones, but allows
for a variety of legitimate extraction methods. Extracting information should not be
arbitrary. The legitimacy of the described extraction methods derives its status from
the justification to appeal to the falsehoods in the respective accounts (i.e., from the
project of establishing the tie to the phenomenon). I assume that this justification
link typically suffices for establishing the legitimacy of the method.20 But let me
turn to concrete methods. In some cases, the understanding’s content is closely related
to the falsehoods. In the case of the ideal gas law, one can understand the normal
19 Note that this result is not specific to understanding. It also matters for debates about model
explanation, etc.
20 Recall that the justification question need not collapse into the relation question.
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gases’ pressure-temperature-volume relation by factoring into account how much the
falsehoods in the law’s derivation basis differ from reality. For instance, understanding
that the molecules’ collisions slightly affect the pressure-temperature-volume relation
partially explains why the normal gases’ measures differ from the ideal gas law’s
predictions. In such a case, one can construct a veridical counterpart of the gas law’s
derivation (for a detailed case study see Strevens 2008, ch. 8; for a critical view see
Rice 2019, sect. 3.1). Pincock illustrates another case of a close relationship between
the falsehoods and the understanding’s content. He argues that there are cases where
we can mathematically transform the original equations that contain the falsehoods (in his
case the assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep) to equations that don’t (2014).
Alexandra proposes a similar approach for economic models (2008). She suggests
constructing open formulas from felicitous idealized models that can be applied to
real-world cases.21 In other cases, the result we obtain from working with a falsehood
is a hypothesis that needs to be refined. For instance, in the case of the Lotka-Volterra
model the fit of measured data and the model’s prediction is only a rather loose
one. The measured population development is only roughly cyclic-like. Such an
empirical success, at best, gives rise to the hypothesis that there are cyclical-like
(dependency) relationships between predator and prey populations. However, such a
rough hypothesis does not seem enough for understanding the predator-prey relations.
And indeed biologists did not leave the model unchanged. Instead, they refined and
de-idealized it to obtain a better fit with the measured data.
In all the cases so far, the extracted information was closely related to the falsehoods.
But there are also other extraction methods. For instance, in some cases one can
infer information based on the fact that an idealized model as a whole is empirically
successful. According to Kennedy, using idealized models can generate so-called
comparison cases that allow model users to identify explanatory ‘difference-making’
factors (2012, p. 331). According to Bokulich (2016) and Rice (2016, 2018), one can
extract counterfactual information from working with models. Take the lattice gas
models. According to Rice, such models “[...] can be used to extract various kinds of
modal information that can be used to provide explanations of the behaviors of real
fluids” (2018, p. 2802, my italics). For instance, ‘[l]attice gas models can show us how
patterns of fluid flow counterfactually depend on the fluid’s pressure, density, and
viscosity” (2018, p. 2810). It is arguably this modal information that is an element of
understanding fluid flow. Or recall the eider model. It examines the foraging behavior
of eiders. Eiders dive to catch their food (typically blue mussels). What is peculiar
about their foraging behavior is that the eiders dive most frequently at times that are
21 Contra Alexandrova, the information we extract from models is typically not the starting point of
working with the model but the end. It is because of the model’s empirical success that we have a good
reason to believe that the extracted information holds true for real-world phenomena.
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the least profitable from a preying point of view, namely when the currents are getting
stronger. Instead, one would expect them to dive when the currents are less strong.
So, the explanandum of interest is, say, ‘Why do the eiders dive most frequently at
times that are the least profitable?’ The result of applying the eider model leads to the
hypothesis that the foraging pattern seems to be an adaptive response to a tradeoff
between short-term energetics in dive cycles, longer term digestive constraints, and
the cyclical nature of tidal currents (cf. Rice 2018, p. 2805). Rice writes explicitly that
(2018, p. 2808, my italics)
[...] the mathematical techniques involved in optimality modeling allow biologists
to extract modal information about how the explanandum counterfactually depends
on population-level constraints and tradeoffs among fitness enhancing variables
and why most of the physical features of the target system(s) are irrelevant to the
target explanandum.
It is these results one commits to in understanding the eiders’ behavior.
Extracted information can also be information about which factors are negligible for
the phenomenon of interest, as suggested by Strevens (2008, 2017; see also M. Elgin
and Sober 2002; Khalifa 2017, ch. 6.3.2).22 An illustrative example is given by Elgin
herself (2017, p. 263, my italics):
Familiar gas models represent gas molecules as lacking attractive force. If the
results of our calculations are confirmed when we read them back into the target,
we have reason to think that intermolecular forces do not play a significant role in
gas dynamics. Knowing as we do that every material object attracts every other
one, we do not conclude that there is no attraction. Rather, we conclude that for the
sort of understanding we currently seek [...] intermolecular attraction is negligible.
According to the extraction view, what is an element of the content of under-
standing normal gases’ volume-temperature relation is only the true proposition that
22 The extraction view is nonetheless substantially different from the non-difference-maker view of
scientific falsehoods in at least two respects. (a) According to the extraction view, there is no need
for the falsehoods to be rendered harmless. They do not need to point to non-difference makers. It
only matters that they are legitimate and that they can be used to extract relevant information. (b)
The non-difference-maker view is crucially limited. Strevens assumes that the non-idealized parts of
a model describe the difference-makers for the explanatory target and the idealized parts point to
non-difference makers (Strevens 2008, p. 318):
The content of an idealized model, then, can be divided into two parts. The first part contains the difference-
makers for the explanatory target. [...] The second part is all idealization; its overt claims are false but its role
is to point to parts of the actual world that do not make a difference to the explanatory target
This account cannot cope with cases where the idealizations are indispensable for extracting the
explanatory information. In such cases, the non-idealized parts do not contain all the difference-
makers for the phenomenon to be explained. Instead, one extracts information about the relevant
difference-makers from the falsehoods. The account can also not cope with cases of falsehoods that
distort difference-makers. For examples of both cases see, e.g., Rice 2018. The extraction view can easily
cope with these cases.
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intermolecular attraction is negligible for the pressure-volume-temperature relation,
not the known-to-be-false assumption that gas molecules do not collide.
To sum up: When felicitous falsehoods are empirically and robustly successful
and legitimate, we conclude that they capture something that is true of real-world
phenomena. Then, we can extract what is captured and the latter fosters our under-
standing of the phenomenon of interest. The extracted information is an element of the
proposition that comprise a scientific understanding of the phenomena. As we have
seen, there is a variety of information that can be extracted from felicitous legitimate
falsehoods. Sometimes one gains a schematic content and sometimes information
about counterfactual facts. So, there can be a close relationship between the falsehoods
(or the model) and the extracted information; but there doesn’t have to be. In the next
section, I address how the extraction view can do justice to the epistemic value of the
falsehoods. But before I turn to the epistemic addition to the extraction view, I want
to address some challenges for and limits of the extraction view.
6.3 Challenges for and limits of the extraction view
The extraction view faces some challenges and limitations. First, the extraction view
needs to explain why scientists often explicitly work or reason with the falsehoods but
do not always with extracted information (as Elgin emphasizes (2017, ch. 2). I think
that there are three main reasons: (i) Falsehoods are often employed for their practical
value. They are easier to handle in calculation and theoretical reasoning and they might
be needed to solve the model’s equations. If one is aware that and in which respects
they are inaccurate, there can be more value than harm in using the falsehoods. (ii)
Such cases do not seem to be too much different from using deliberate falsehoods in
our everyday life. Take Elgin’s example of Fiona who accepts for the purposes of travel
planning that Amherst is 90 miles from Boston (2017, ch. 2). Obviously, Fiona does
not accept that Amherst is precisely 90 miles from Boston. A most natural description
of what she accepts is that Amherst is approximately 90 miles from Boston. When it
comes to numbers we often streamline. We often say that it is 3:00 pm, although it is
3:02 pm, and so on. One might object that science – in contrast to everyday life – is a
matter of precision. We can be sloppy in everyday life, but not in science. However,
the crucial similarity is not the sloppiness. It is the fact that the subjects are fully aware
of the fact that the claims are not true, strictly speaking. (iii) We use the falsehoods for
their epistemic value, as I explain below. For instance, the falsehoods (or the models
that involve them) might provide us with important epistemic access to the relevant
information.
Second, I offered no knockdown argument for the claim that felicitous legitimate
falsehoods contribute to the understanding’s content by enabling one to extract
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its elements. But I think it is the best view to accommodate all the facts about
understanding and felicitous legitimate falsehoods, as I have argued above.
Third, the extraction view does not offer any guarantee that only true information
is extracted from the falsehoods; nor that understanding subjects exclusively commit
to true propositions. None of the extraction methods that I mentioned guarantees
that. But guaranteeing the latter is not the aim of my view. I only want to account
for the factivity of understanding in view of felicitous legitimate falsehoods. I also
do not think that it is a problem that the extraction does not guarantee that only true
information is extracted from the falsehoods. On the one hand, this problem is not
specific to the extraction view. Except for deductive reasoning based on true premises,
there are no inference methods that guarantee true results. On the other hand, I can
arguably shift the burden of proof. I am not aware of any case studies of felicitous
legitimate falsehoods where false information that was extracted from models was
considered to be an element of one’s understanding’s account. So, the burden of proof
is to provide a convincing counterexample to the extraction view.
Fourth, the extraction view does not offer any story about how to construct the whole
systematic account (e.g., the complete explanation) from working with a falsehood or
model. As we have seen, we typically only extract elements of it but rarely (if at all) the
whole systematic account. This is arguably a cost to pay for decoupling representation
from understanding. But I do not think it is too a high a cost to pay. What counts as a
sufficiently systematic account of a phenomena for understanding it is a project of its
own. If the systematic account is supposed to be an explanation, we need a theory
of explanation. Something analogous is true for any other systematic account that is
considered acceptable for understanding phenomena.
7 the epistemic value of felicitous legitimate falsehoods
According to the extraction view, felicitous legitimate falsehoods are compatible with
a factive view of understanding. Now I turn to the fourth key step in my proposal,
namely to account for the epistemic value of these falsehoods and to show that they are
no cognitive crutches. One needs to show that the falsehoods facilitate understanding
by virtue of being the very falsehoods they are, that they do it in an epistemically
relevant way, and that they might be indispensable. Elgin doubts that factivists (what
she calls veritists) can account for these desiderata (2017, pp. 28-29):
If he is feeling charitable, the veritist might grant that such devices could play
a heuristic role in the presentation or application of the theory. But he would
insist that for the account to be epistemically acceptable, they must be excisable
with no loss of cognitive content or epistemic justification. Such a position is
likely to implausibly discredit much of our best science. [...] Veritists evidently
have to simply deny that accounts that ineliminably deploy devices like the
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Hardy-Weinberg model or the mutually indifferent deliberators behind the veil of
ignorance are epistemically acceptable.
Elgin is not alone with her concerns. Rice argues that “[t]o simply reject these
highly idealized models as ‘nonexplanatory’ would be to render incomprehensible
much of what contemporary science has purported to explain” (2018, p. 2809). Daniela
Bailer-Jones emphasizes that “[i]f a model is only an heuristic device, it need not tell
us anything about how things really are concerning the phenomenon modelled” (2003,
p. 60). And Julian Reiss writes (2013, p. 282):
The problem is [...] that if that is all models do, the mystery is not resolved.
Why do economists build complex, mathematically sophisticated models rather
than, say, resort to creativity and intuition, crystal balls, hypothesis-generating
algorithms or consciousness-enhancing drugs? All of these sources of inspiration
would be a lot easier to come by, and some of these would be more fun, than doing
the hard work of constructing and solving a model. To warrant their existence,
models must do more than to provide hypotheses. They must have some genuine
epistemic benefit.
However, these concerns can be addressed by combining the extraction view with
a plausible answer to the separate question of how the falsehoods (or the models that
involve them) relate to the real-world phenomena. We need an answer to the relation
question to answer why models are better than crystal balls or why some models might
be even indispensable in science. The extraction view only tells us something about the
relationship between the falsehoods and the content of understanding. Importantly,
answers to the relation question can go hand in hand with the extraction view. Let me
illustrate this by showing that Elgin’s exemplification view is perfectly compatible with
the extraction view. Recall that, according to her view, felicitous falsehoods provide us
with epistemic access to the phenomena of interest by exemplifying some of their relevant
features. She also emphasizes that they provide us with access to crucial information
that would often difficult to get otherwise. This is why they facilitate understanding by
being the very falsehoods they are – in an epistemically relevant way. Such falsehoods
could not be replaced by crystal balls or hypothesis-generating algorithms because
they – unlike these balls or algorithms – provide epistemic access to information. This
is their epistemic value. Such a combined view thus does not render the felicitous
legitimate falsehoods epistemically idle. Moreover, that they enable us to extract the
information explains the judgment that models are explanatory. We consider them
to be explanatory because we explain with propositions that are extracted from the
models. An extraction view is also not committed to the claim that falsehoods should
be avoided in science. Valuable tools are kept and not removed. Without idealizations
it would be notably more difficult to gain access to information that is required for
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understanding (for a similar point see, e.g., Craver 2014; Potochnik 2017; Strevens
2017). And that is also why “[...] scientific (and other disciplinary) communities are
within their epistemic rights to deploy them” (Elgin 2017, ch. 5).
But what about cases where the falsehoods are considered to be indispensable?
In these cases, they give us an epistemic access that could perhaps not be gained
otherwise. As Rice claims (2018, pp. 2809-2810; similarly Morrison 2009, p. 128):
[...] these modeling techniques are often [...] ineliminable because they allow
scientific modelers to extract the desired explanatory information that would
otherwise be inaccessible. [...] without these [...] techniques [they] would no
longer be able to provide certain scientific explanations.
Batterman puts it as follows (2009, p. 428):
[...] some idealizations are explanatorily ineliminable. That is to say, I argue
that the full understanding of certain phenomena cannot be obtained through a
completely detailed, nonidealized representation.
However, the only thesis that these claims justify is a thesis that is compatible
with factivism, namely that the falsehoods are indispensible in the process of obtaining
understanding. The claim that they are indispensible for the content of understanding
is a non sequitur. It is perfectly fine to endorse the genuine-epistemic-access stance on
models and felicitous legitimate falsehoods without thereby endorsing the claim that
falsehoods are elements of the content of the obtained understanding. Being essential
for providing epistemic access to crucial explanatory information is not the same as
being explanatorily ineliminable. Consider a different case. Imagine that there is just
one method for detecting whether some rash is a disease of a particular kind. Without
this method we couldn’t know whether a person has that disease. In other words, we
would not have epistemic access to this information otherwise. But even if so, the
explanation of the fact that this person has the disease need not involve the method.
Similarly, an understanding that makes use of information that could only be gained
by means of falsehoods is not required to contain any of the falsehoods among the
propositions the understanding subject commits her- or himself to.
8 concluding remarks
Understanding a phenomenon requires an epistemic commitment to a systematic
account of it. In view of the fact that felicitous legitimate falsehoods figure into
our scientific understanding, Elgin maintains that retaining the truth requirement
for understanding amounts to construing science as cognitively defective or as non-
cognitive. I have tried to show that this is not the case. A factive view of understanding
can fully accommodate the epistemic importance of scientific falsehoods. By distorting
8 concluding remarks 29
their target objects, felicitous legitimate falsehoods might provide us with epistemic
access to true information that is difficult or even impossible to discern otherwise.
That is why their falsity is a virtue and not a vice. Science is not cognitively defective
or non-cognitive in employing such tools. But felicitous falsehoods are not more
nor less than tools. Our understanding of the phenomena is grounded in the true
information we extract from the falsehoods. This does not render the falsehoods
themselves elements of the understanding’s content. To use a Wittgensteinian image,
one might need a ladder to climb up; without it one does not reach the top. But
after climbing, the ladder need not be taken along.23 Similarly, there might be no
understanding regarding some phenomena without falsehoods. But the obtained
understanding does not contain those falsehoods as propositions one is committed to.
According to the factive view I proposed, science does not need to get rid of felicitous
legitimate falsehoods. They will presumably continue to be a crucial element of the
advancement of science.
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